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ABSTRACT. This paper analyzes overlapping-generations models where natural capital
is owned by selfish agents. Transfers in favor of young agents reduce the rate of depletion
and increase output growth. It is shown that intergenerational transfers may be preferred
to laissez-faire by an indefinite sequence of generations: if the resource share in production
is sufficiently high, the welfare gain induced by preservation compensates for the loss due
to taxation. This conclusion is reinforced when other assets are available, e.g. man-made
capital, claims on monopoly rents, and R&D investment. Transfers raise the welfare of all
generations, except that of the first resource owner: if resource endowments are taxed at
time zero, all successive generations support resource-saving policies for purely selfish
reasons.
1. Introduction
Preserving intergenerational equity has become a worldwide political
concern, and achieving sustainability is increasingly considered a relevant
social goal. As over-exploitation represents a threat for the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs, a major source of intergenerational
conflict is represented by the intensive use of natural resources in the
production process. Since Hotelling’s (1931) seminal work, economists have
pointed out several potential sources of the problem: over-exploitation
may result from market incompleteness, excessive competition, myopic
behavior, and the lack of incentives for investment in preservation.
Accordingly, public intervention may be called for either to restore efficiency
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(Toman, 1987) or settle conflicts between intertemporal efficiency and
intergenerational fairness (Howarth and Norgaard, 1990).1
In recent times, the attribution of property rights over natural resources
has gained much attention in the policy debate. However, neither
sustainability nor resource preservation are guaranteed when natural
capital is private property. This result holds in general equilibrium
models with infinitely lived agents (Pezzey, 1992), and is furthermore
valid when assuming selfish agents with finite lifetimes (Mourmouras,
1993): market valuation of resource assets can only limit the depletion
rate to the extent that preserving natural capital is profitable to agents
currently alive. Consequently, achieving intergenerational fairness requires
a system of transfers that redistributes income among generations:
examples in the recent literature on resource economics include Howarth
(1991), Mourmouras (1993), Krautkraemer and Batina (1999), Gerlagh
and Keyzer (2001). The logic underlying these contributions is that
of pursuing intergenerational fairness while preserving intertemporal
efficiency, and this typically implies considering lump-sum transfers.
However, the welfare effects of transfers can also be investigated from a
different perspective, which is alternative to (but not conflicting with) the
efficiency-and-equity logic. Real-world policymaking is often constrained
by institutional feasibility: lump-sum taxes have a limited application, and
policies involving intergenerational transfers likely need the support of the
constituency. Building on this point, this paper poses the following question.
Consider an economy with overlapping generations where natural capital
is essential for production. Suppose that, under laissez-faire conditions, the
economy displays unsustainability – i.e. utility of future generations will
be lower than current welfare levels. Would selfish agents agree on a system
of intergenerational transfers implying a lower rate of resource extraction?
Postulating a direct link between political support and individual
welfare, this paper tackles the issue by characterizing individual payoffs
in a regime-contingent fashion – that is, lifetime utility levels of a given
generation under alternative policy regimes – assuming that transfers
are implemented through distortionary measures. The crucial result is
that a higher degree of resource preservation may be strictly preferred
by private agents, provided that a critical condition on technological
parameters is satisfied. More precisely, it is shown that if the resource-
share in production is sufficiently high, taxing natural capital incomes
to subsidize young generations guarantees higher lifetime utility for all
newborn generations. The reason for this result is that a lower rate of
depletion increases the growth rate of the economy in the subsequent
period: if resource productivity is sufficiently high, this positive effect on
second-period income more than compensates for the negative effect of
taxation, and agents will prefer non-zero transfers to laissez-faire conditions
1 Bromley (1990) forcefully argues that environmental policy should not be
restricted to efficiency targets. In line with this view is the idea that sustainability
is a matter of intergenerational equity and, once the social objective incorporates
fairness concerns, efficiency per se does not guarantee socially optimal outcomes
(Howarth and Norgaard, 1990).
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for purely selfish reasons. Moreover, this mechanism is enhanced by the
presence of other assets representing individual wealth. Extending the
model to include man-made capital, monopoly rents, and R&D sectors, it is
shown that the critical condition becomes less restrictive because the returns
from these assets also benefit from the positive growth effect induced by a
higher degree of preservation.
From a policymaking perspective, the private desire for resource-saving
policies unfolds if young generations are credibly pre-committed. In this
regard, it is shown that permanent transfers may arise as an indefinite
sequence of lifetime contracts: if young agents were asked to choose
between permanent transfers and permanent laissez-faire, the former
option would be preferred. In the absence of commitment devices, transfers
may arise as political equilibria in sequential voting games when young
agents have majority power or old agents are induced to cooperate
by the presence of regime-switching costs. In all the above cases, the
intergenerational distribution of benefits under resource-saving policies is
not Pareto comparable with that obtained under laissez-faire, since resource
owners at time zero bear the burden of initial taxation: similarly to Gale
(1973), if the first resource owner partially renounces his claim over initial
endowments, the transmission of this credit forward in time yields welfare
gains for all successive generations.
2. The basic model
In line with recent literature, a sustainable path is defined as a path
along which welfare is non-declining over time.2 The economy has an
overlapping-generations structure: each agent lives for two periods, and
enjoys utility from consumption when young (c) and consumption when
old (e). Population in period t consists of Nt young and Nt−1 old individuals,
with a constant rate n of population growth: Nt+1 = Nt(1 + n). Denoting by
Ut the lifetime utility of an agent born in period t, sustainability requires
Ut+1(ct+1, et+2) ≥ Ut(ct , et+1), ∀t ∈ [0, ∞). (1)
Denoting by Rt the stock of natural resources available in the economy, we
also define no depletion paths as those paths satisfying
Rt+1 ≥ Rt , ∀t ∈ [0, ∞). (2)
Our formal analysis draws on Mourmouras (1993) and Krautkraemer and
Batina (1999): in this section, we augment the Mourmouras (1993) model
by considering exogenous technical progress; further extensions regarding
man-made capital, monopoly rents and endogenous technical change
are developed later in section 4. Prospects for sustainability and natural
preservation depend on the intergenerational distribution of entitlements,
2 This definition of sustainability may be referred to as the concept of ’sustained
development’, as defined e.g. in Pezzey (1997). Recent formal literature
considers non-declining utility a pre-requisite for sustainable development, although
sustainability in this broader sense is nowadays referred to in the presence of global
environmental problems (such as climate change and biodiversity loss) that are
not considered in the present analysis.
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which affect the time-path of resource use, and, in turn, the production
frontier and consumption possibilities of generations yet to be born. In this
regard, we assume a grandfathering process a` la Krautkraemer and Batina
(1999): at the beginning of period t, the whole stock of natural resources in
the economy Rt is held by old agents. Part of R is used as natural capital in
production (X), while the remaining stock constitutes resource assets (A)
Rt = At + Xt. (3)
Old agents sell resource assets At to young agents at unit price qt , and receive
a gross marginal rent pt for each unit of natural capital Xt supplied to firms.
Quantities of resource assets and natural capital per young individual are
denoted by at = At/Nt and xt = Xt/Nt , respectively. While natural capital
is destroyed in the production process, resource assets sold to newborn
generations are brought forward in time: in each period, the resource grows
at constant regeneration rate ε, implying
Rt+1 = (1 + ε)(Rt − Xt) = (1 + ε)At. (4)
Only young agents work, supplying one unit of labor services. The
consumption good is produced by means of natural capital and labor,
according to technology
Yt = (mtXt)α(Nt)1−α , (5)
mt = mt−1(1 + δ), (6)
where Yt is aggregate output, Nt equals total labor units supplied by the
currently young, and mt is the state of technology, representing a process
that enhances the productivity of natural capital in each period: δ > 0 is the
rate of resource-augmenting technological progress.3 Denoting by w the wage
rate, profit maximization implies
pt = αytx−1t = αmαt xα−1t , (7)
wt = (1 − α)yt = (1 − α)mαt xαt , (8)
where yt = Yt/Nt is output per worker. Intergenerational transfers take
the following form: young agents’ investment is subsidized by taxing the
income from natural capital of old agents, and fiscal authorities keep a
balanced budget in each period. Formally,
ct = wt − qt(1 − dt)at , (9)
et+1 = [pt+1(1 − τt+1)xt+1 + qt+1at+1](1 + n), (10)
ptτt Xt = qtdt At , (11)
yt = ct + et(1 + n)−1. (12)
3 In general, technical progress in Cobb–Douglas technologies is input neutral, and
(5) may be rewritten as Y= XαL1−αmˆ, where the growth rate of mˆ = mα is the
Hicks-neutral rate of technical progress. Specification (5) is chosen to emphasize
that prospects for sustainability depend on the resource-saving effect of technical
progress (mt+1/mt), and not on its global effect on output levels (mˆt+1/mˆt) – see
Proposition 1.
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Equations (9) and (10) represent budget constraints faced by each individual
born in period t, where d is the subsidy rate on investment in resource
assets, and τ is the tax rate on natural capital income. Equation (11) is the
government budget constraint, and equation (12) is the aggregate constraint
of the economy. Agents are homogeneous and have logarithmic preferences:
lifetime utility is Ut = log ct + β log et+1, where β ∈ (0, 1) is the individual
discount factor. Equilibrium in the resource market requires
qt = pt(1 − τt) (13)
in each period. The consumer problem consists of choosing ct and et+1 in
order to maximize lifetime utility subject to (9)–(10): first-order conditions
read
et+1
βct
= qt+1(1 + ε)
qt(1 − dt) . (14)
The temporary equilibrium of the economy is characterized by the following
relations:4 the natural capital-resource asset ratio (z) equals
zt ≡ xtat =
α(1 + β)
β(1 − α) (1 − τt)(1 − dt), (15)
and the dynamics of the economy are described by
θ Rt+1 =
1 + ε
1 + zt , (16)
θ xt+1 =
zt+1(1 + ε)
zt(1 + zt+1)(1 + n) , (17)
θ
y
t+1 =
[
zt+1(1 + ρ)
zt(1 + zt+1)
]α
, (18)
where θvt+1 = (vt+1/vt) for the generic variable vt . Note that in equation (18)
we have defined the augmentation rate ρ as
1 + ρ ≡ (1 + ε)(1 + δ)(1 + n)−1. (19)
In the following paragraphs, we describe the laissez-faire equilibrium and
analyze the implications of intergenerational transfers.
Laissez-faire economy. Setting tax-subsidy rates equal to zero, it follows from
(15) that the natural capital–resource asset ratio is constant over time
zt = α(1 + β)
β(1 − α) = z˜ for all t. (20)
The laissez-faire economy exhibits the knife-edge property: setting zt+1 =
zt = z˜ in (18), the net growth rate of output per worker is constant over time,
and it can be positive or negative, depending on parameters. With respect
to Mourmouras (1993), the presence of technological progress modifies the
4 Detailed derivations and proofs can be found in the Mathematical Appendix of
this paper: see Valente (2006).
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link between resource depletion and sustainability, determining possible
conflicts among alternative social objectives. In fact, a necessary and
sufficient condition for no depletion in the laissez-faire economy is
z˜ ≤ ε, (21)
whereas:
Proposition 1. A necessary and sufficient condition for sustainability in the
laissez-faire economy is
z˜ ≤ ρ, (22)
or equivalently
1 + γ ≤
(
1 − α
α
)[
(1 + δ)(1 + ε)
(1 + n) − 1
]
− 1, (23)
where γ = β−1 − 1 is the individual pure rate of time preference.
Proof. Under laissez-faire zt+1 = zt = z˜, which implies that Ut is linear
in log yt . Hence, condition (1) is met under laissez-faire only if θ y ≥ 1.
Substituting z˜ in (18) it follows that θ y ≥ 1 requires that (22) be satisfied.
Substituting (15) and γ = β−1 − 1 in (22) yields (23). 
Expression (23) is conceptually analogous to the long-run sustainability
condition which holds in economies with infinitely lived agents: non-
declining welfare requires that the positive joint effect of technical progress
(δ) and natural regeneration (ε) not be offset by the impatience to consume
(γ ).5 Whether sustainability conditions are more restrictive than conditions
for no depletion depends on the gap between the rates of technological
progress and population growth: no depletion per se does not guarantee
sustained utility, and different combinations of parameters may determine
sustainability, no depletion, both, or neither of the two. The interrelations,
and possible conflicts, between alternative social objectives are described in
figure 1. Note that if z˜ = ε and δ = n, lifetime utility and the resource stock
are both constant over time. This special case, represented by point S in
figure 1, satisfies most conventional notions of sustainability: utility is non-
declining (standard definition), each generation enjoys the same welfare
level (intergenerational equity), and natural capital as such is preserved
over time (strong sustainability).
Intergenerational transfers. Proposition 1 suggests that if the economy
is unsustainable under laissez-faire, a ceteris paribus reduction in zt
due to intergenerational transfers will bring the economy towards the
sustainability threshold. Balanced budget policies affect the gap (zt − z˜)
unambiguously: from (15) and (20)
zt = z˜(1 − τt)(1 − dt). (24)
5 In the standard capital–resource model, optimal consumption per capita is
asymptotically non-decreasing if the social discount rate does not exceed the sum
of the rates of technical progress and natural regeneration (Valente, 2005).
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Figure 1. From (21) and (22), the sustainability threshold zsus = ρ increases with δ,
while the no depletion locus zndp = ε is horizontal in the (δ, z) plane. If δ < n, the
laissez-faire economy may exhibit no depletion together with unsustainability; if δ > n,
the economy may exhibit resource depletion together with sustainability.
Assume that the policymaker aims at achieving a pre-determined level z′.
Substituting (24) in the government budget constraint ( 11), the target level
zt = z′ is obtained by setting dt = d ′ and τt = τ ′, where
d ′ = (z˜ − z′)(1 + z˜)−1andτ ′ = (z˜ − z′)[z˜(1 + z′)]−1. (25)
For example, setting z′ = ε in (25) yields tax-subsidy rates that implement
zero depletion of the resource stock. By the same reasoning:6
Lemma 2. Setting z′ = ρ in each period implies Ut+1 = Ut for all t ∈ [0, ∞).
More generally, any fiscal intervention that keeps zt below the laissez-
faire level z˜ constitutes a resource-saving policy : lowering the natural
capital–resource assets ratio corresponds to lower rates of resource use
in production, or equivalently, to a higher degree of preservation. Note that
an equivalent resource-saving effect is obtained if the government taxes
resource use of firms, as shown by Mourmouras (1993: section 5.1).
3. Resource-saving transfers and lifetime welfare
We now compare the welfare effects of laissez-faire and transfers in each
period. In this regime-contingent formulation, individual payoffs represent
the potential political support for resource-saving measures, as if agents
were asked to choose between laissez-faire and intergenerational transfers
6 All lemmas are proved in Valente (2006).
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during their life. Assuming that each newborn agent takes the history of
previous regimes as given, it is shown that resource-saving transfers in
both periods of life may yield higher payoffs with respect to laissez-faire if
a precise condition regarding parameters is satisfied.
3.1. Regime-contingent payoffs
Denote by ηt the outcome of an unspecified political process, indicating
whether laissez-faire or resource-saving transfers are implemented in
period t
ηt =
{
0 ⇔ zt = z˜ (laissez-faire)
1 ⇔ zt = z′ < z˜ (resource-saving transfers) (26)
The individual payoff Vt of each agent born in t ≥ 0 depends on the two
outcomes realized during his lifetime (ηt and ηt+1) as well as on the whole
history of previous outcomes Ht = {η0, η1, . . . , ηt−1}
Vt(ηt , ηt+1, Ht) = Ut[ct(ηt , Ht), et+1(ηt , ηt+1, Ht)]. (27)
Since agents cannot modify previous outcomes, Ht is taken as given and
the individual payoff of an agent born in T ≥ 0 can be written as (see
Valente, 2006)
VT (ηT , ηT+1) = 
T + log
{(
zT
1 + zT
)α [ (1 + ρ)zT+1
(1 + zT )(1 + zT+1)
]αβ}
, (28)
where 
T = 
T (HT ) depends on previous regimes. We will refer to
VT (0, 0) and VT (1, 1) as payoffs yielded by life-persistent regimes (ηt = ηt+1).
Computing the various payoffs on the basis of (28), it follows that
VT (0, 0) > VT (0, 1), (29)
VT (1, 0) > VT (1, 1), (30)
for any z′ < z˜. On the one hand, this result is intuitive: inequalities (29) and
(30) imply that if agents could choose ηT+1 taking the previous regime ηT
as given, they would prefer avoiding taxation in the second period of life.
On the other hand, (29) and (30) do not rule out situations where selfish
agents would prefer persistent transfers to persistent laissez-faire: VT (1, 1)
and VT (0, 0) cannot be ranked a priori, so it is possible to have the interesting
case
VT (1, 0) > VT (1, 1) > VT (0, 0) > VT (0, 1). (31)
The explicit condition for obtaining (31) is derived below.
Proposition 3. Individual payoffs are ranked as in (31) if and only if
(
α
1 + β
β + α
)1+β (
β
1 − α
β + α
)β
<
(
z′
1 + z′
)1+β (
1 + z′)−β . (32)
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Figure 2. Graph (a): fixing β = 0.625 and µ = 0.9, the gap  = V (0, 0) − V (1, 1)
is an inverted-U function of α. Condition (32) defines the interval (α∗, 1) over
which V (1, 1) > V (0, 0). Graph (b): the welfare gap as a parametric function of
µ = {0.7, 0.8, 0.9}. The critical threshold increases as µ declines.
Proof. Substituting zT and zT+1 in (28) for the two regimes considered, it
follows that V (0, 0) < V (1, 1) if and only if(
z˜
1 + z˜
)α(1+β) ( 1
1 + z˜
)αβ
<
(
z′
1 + z′
)α(1+β) ( 1
1 + z′
)αβ
.
Substituting 1 + z˜ = (α + β) [β(1 − α)]−1, this inequality reduces to (32).
From (29) and (30), if (32) is satisfied the only possible ranking is
(31). 
Condition (32) is necessary and sufficient to have VT (1, 1) > VT (0, 0), i.e.
private agents strictly prefer persistent transfers to laissez-faire. For a given
discount factor β, inequality (32) defines the set of all possible combinations
of α and z′ implying VT (1, 1) > VT (0, 0). This set can be characterized by
defining the policy index µ ≡ z′/z˜, which is determined by fiscal authorities
through the level of tax-subsidy rates: from (24), the policy index equals
µ = (1 − τ )(1 − d), and µ < 1 indicates a resource-saving policy. Using (28),
the welfare gap  = V(0, 0) − V(1, 1) can be written as
 = log
{(
1
µ
)α+αβ [
β(1 − α) + µα(1 + β)
β(1 − α) + α(1 + β)
]α+2αβ}
, (33)
Fixing β and µ, the gap function (α) has an inverted-U shape: as shown
in figure 2(a), there exists a critical value α∗ > 0 such that (α∗) = 0, with 
being negative (positive) when the resource share exceeds (falls short of) this
threshold level.7 In other words, if the resource share exceeds a critical threshold
level, lifetime utility is higher with persistent transfers than under laissez-faire
conditions. The economic interpretation of this result is as follows: reducing
the rate of resource depletion in t implies higher output growth in t + 1; if
7 From (33), it can be shown that  ≤ 0 requires
α ≥ β(1 + µˆ)[µˆ − µ + β(1 − µ)]−1 ∈ (0, 1),
where µˆ = µ(1+β)/(1+2β) > µ. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this
proof.
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resource productivity is sufficiently high, this favorable effect on second-
period income offsets the negative effect due to taxation. Note that the
critical level of the resource share depends on policy targets: as shown in
figure 2(b), α∗ is higher the lower is µ. This is because µ is lower the higher
is the level of transfers: if fiscal authorities impose slight deviations from
laissez-faire (µ close to 1), the private cost of transfers is relatively small
and condition (32) is likely to be met; conversely, if the policymaker is more
inclined towards natural preservation (µ close to 0), persistent transfers are
more demanding and condition (32 ) is more restrictive.
From a policymaking perspective, the result that permanent transfers
may be welfare improving for newborn generations is relevant. In
particular, ranking (31) suggests that, while individual preferences about
policy regimes can be in favor of intergenerational transfers, this private
desire for resource-saving policies unfolds if generations are credibly
pre-committed. This statement is investigated in section 3.3., where the
commitment device is represented by lifetime contracts. In a sequential
choice setting, instead, unanimous political support without commitment
can only be achieved through cooperative voting: in this regard, section 3.4
shows that cooperation can be induced by positive costs of regime-
switching. Before discussing these issues, we complete the analysis of
distortionary transfers by comparing first-best and second-best policies for
intergenerational equity.
3.2. First-best and second-best policies
In order to assess the effects of distortionary transfers on allocative
efficiency, a convenient benchmark is to assume that the policy target is
to achieve intergenerational equity.8 In this case, the first-best allocation
is the Rawlsian optimum, which requires two conditions to be satisfied:
first, all generations enjoy the same utility level U∗; second, U∗ must be the
maximum utility level that can be sustained indefinitely. The first condition
requires mtxt constant over time
x∗t =
(
1
1 + δ
)t
ρ
1 + ρ r0, r
∗
t =
(
1
1 + δ
)t
r0. (34)
The depletion path (34) implies a constant output level y∗ = [ρ(1 +
ρ)−1m0r0]α . The second condition requires
ct = c∗ = (1 + β)−1y∗, et = e∗ = β(1 + n)(1 + β)−1y∗. (35)
Hence, along the first-best path, utility equals
U∗ = log {[β(1 + n)]β [y∗(1 + β)−1]1+β} (36)
for all agents born in t ≥ 0. If the government aims at implementing the
Rawlsian optimum, a first-best policy is one that decentralizes the allocation
described by (34)–(35). Exactly as in Mourmouras (1993), the first-best
policy cannot rely on a lump-sum transfer scheme alone, due to the
8 Mathematical details and proofs for this section are omitted to save space: see
Valente (2006).
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asymmetric intergenerational distribution of property rights over natural
resources. More precisely, achieving the first-best requires expropriating
natural capital of the initial old generation: at t = 0 the whole resource
stock is nationalized; old agents at t = 0 receive a stock of fiat currency
that will be transferred to successive generations when acquiring output
units; at each t ≥ 0, the government sells x∗t units of resources to firms, and
rebates the proceeds to the young generation via lump-sum transfers. This
policy is equivalent to a redistribution of property rights across generations
operated in each period by fiscal authorities, and implies the same utility
level (36) for all agents born in t ≥ 0.9
The fact that, under the first-best policy, the initial old generation is
expropriated is of particular interest here. In section 3.1, distortionary
policies aimed at reducing the rate of resource use also imply a welfare
reduction for the initial old generation. In order to compare the two policies,
consider a couple of tax-subsidy rates that implement a constant-utility
path. As shown in Lemma 2, this means that authorities set z′ = ρ in each
period, and obtain (34). With xt = x∗t , output equals yt = y∗ in each period.
However, with respect to the Rawlsian optimum, consumption is lower in
the first period and higher in the second
ct = c∗∗ = (1 − α)(1 + β)−1y∗ < c∗, (37)
et = e∗∗ = (α + β)(1 + n)(1 + β)−1y∗ > e∗. (38)
From (36) and (37)–(38), lifetime welfare under this policy, U∗∗, is below the
first-best
U∗ −U∗∗ = log{(1 − α)−1[β/(α + β)]β} > 0. (39)
The central term in (39) is the efficiency loss in utility terms implied by the
second-best policy. However, the two policies cannot be Pareto ranked: from
(38), the utility level of the first old generation is higher under the second-
best policy. In other words, if agents face an exclusive choice between the
two policies, the young prefer the first-best scheme with nationalization
of the resource stock, whereas the old are better off under distortionary
transfers.
3.3. Lifetime contracts
It follows from Proposition 3 that, when (32) is satisfied, if agents are asked at
birth to sign a lifetime contract requiring them to choose between persistent
transfers and persistent laissez-faire, every agent born in t ≥ 0 chooses
resource-saving transfers. With respect to this result, three main points
should be emphasized. First, lifetime contracts embody a notion of credible
commitment: under ranking (31), agents prefer resource-saving transfers as
long as no regime switch is allowed during the life-cycle. Second, agents
9 The difference with respect to Mourmouras (1993) is given by the presence of
technical progress, which implies that (i) natural capital per capita x∗t declines
over time (instead of being constant); (ii) the Rawlsian optimum is technically
feasible even with exhaustible resources (ε = 0); (iii) the resource stock Rt can be
either declining, constant, or increasing, depending on the gap (δ − n).
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would not enforce such contracts by themselves because resource owners
at t = 0 receive no compensation: this is the ‘first-father problem’ discussed
below. Third, whether a sustainable path would be supported depends on
the whole set of parameters. As shown in figure 2(b), the technological
condition is more restrictive the lower is µ. This implies that the threshold
α∗ is very high when the ‘sustainability gap’ (z˜ − ρ) is huge, whereas
conditions for an agreement on sustainability are less restrictive when z˜
is relatively close to ρ. However, section 4 shows that when other financial
assets exist in the economy, the critical threshold for the resource share is
reduced, and its sensitivity to policy targets becomes less critical in this
regard.
When considering an infinite time horizon, the individual first-best
payoff cannot be assigned to each generation, since implementing Vt (1, 0)
in each t is impossible. From a social-planning perspective, the relevant
inequality in (31) is thus the central one, V (1, 1) > V (0, 0), which refers
to life-persistent regimes. This in turn suggests studying the welfare time
paths implied by the sequences {τt = 0, dt = 0}∞t=0 and {τt = τ ′, dt = d ′}∞t=0 .
We refer to these sequences as permanent laissez-faire and permanent transfers,
respectively. Since the initial resource stock is owned by the old at time zero,
a typical ’first-father problem’ arises: if transfers are voted into existence
at t = 0, all successive generations gain from permanent transfers, but
initial subsidies are financed at the expense of the first old generation.
This generation bears the burden of the new regime without gaining from
it, and welfare improvements thus pertain to newborn agents. In this regard,
we can make two remarks. First, the initial welfare loss for resource owners
implies that the two sequences, permanent laissez-faire and permanent
transfers, cannot be Pareto ranked. Second, due to the first-father problem,
enacting permanent transfers involves a paternalistic action at time zero, as
no generation would selfishly make the initial gift. In this respect, resource-
saving policies recall the logic of Gale-type intergenerational transfers:
considering a two-generations pure exchange economy, Gale (1973) showed
that the first generation can raise future welfare by renouncing part of
its claim over the endowment to the benefit of the second generation,
which in turn transmits a claim to its successor, and so on. In our setting,
transfers work in a similar way: the initial tax τ0 p0X0 amounts to the share
of claims over natural capital not received by the first owner, and subsidies
to the newborn bring the associated credit forward in time. The main
differences with respect to Gale (1973) are that transfers are distortionary,
require commitment, and yield welfare gains only if the critical condition
is satisfied. Nonetheless, Gale’s conclusion can be readapted to the present
context as follows: resource-saving transfers begin after the economy:
has been running along for some time in the [no-transfers]
equilibrium, but at time t = 0 some of the old people realize that
if they are willing to give up ever so little of their second-period
consumption, the economy in the future will move up toward
[higher welfare for future generations]. (. . .) If this altruistic
scenario sounds too unrealistic, one can instead imagine a
central authority which levies an income tax on the old people
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in period zero and then sells this income back to the young.
(ibid., p. 29)
Alternatively, we can imagine a privatization scenario where natural
resources previously owned by the State are sold at a lower-than-efficiency
price to young generations in period zero, and permanent transfers are then
implemented.10
3.4. Sequential voting
With lifetime contracts, resource-saving policies are supported by
successive generations because agents are credibly committed to pay
second-period taxes. An alternative interpretation of Proposition 3 derives
from assuming a sequential process generating political decisions. Suppose
that fiscal authorities act in a representative democracy, and implement the
regime voted by the citizens in each period: all individuals alive in period t
face a discrete choice between laissez-faire (zt = z˜), and a certain amount
of transfers corresponding to the policy proposed by fiscal authorities
(zt = z′ < z˜). For a given voting rule, the sequence of depletion rates is
determined by the outcomes of an indefinitely repeated game. Similar
games are used in the recent literature on social security systems and
political economy (Cooley and Soares, 1998; Boldrin and Rustichini, 2000;
Azariadis and Galasso, 2002). These contributions study whether pay-as-
you-go social security systems may result from political equilibria when
private agents choose to create, maintain, or dismantle intergenerational
transfers. A similar reasoning will be followed here, the main difference
being that the direction of transfers implied by pension financing (young-to-
old) is opposite to that implied by resource-saving policies (old-to-young).
In particular, the different configuration of payoffs in the present model
implies the following:
Lemma 4. If (32) holds, young agents support resource-saving transfers in
any subgame perfect equilibrium sequence.
The intuition for this result follows immediately from (31): laissez-faire
choices in the first period are ruled out by the fact that young agents
prefer resource-saving transfers irrespective of second-period outcomes. The
difference with respect to social-security games is twofold. On the one hand,
Lemma 4 departs from the result, established by Boldrin and Rustichini
(2000: 51), that laissez-faire outcomes can be part of an equilibrium sequence
in pension games (see Valente, 2006). On the other hand, Lemma 4 implies
that in a growing economy (n > 0), simple-majority rules suffice to obtain
permanent transfers as a political equilibrium (ηt = 1 in each t ≥ 0).11 This is
10 In this case, the initial selling price (determined by the government) is equivalent
to a proportional subsidy to the young at time zero: under a balanced budget, the
efficiency loss for the public owner would fall again on the first old generation in
the form of reduced transfers.
11 As in Azariadis and Galasso (2002), consider a simple-majority rule operating
among homogeneous agents within each cohort: if the net rate of population
growth is positive (negative), the majority of citizens is constituted by young
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in contrast to the standard result that the open-loop equilibrium in pension
games features permanent laissez-faire (Hammond, 1975; Sjoblom, 1985;
Azariadis and Galasso, 2002).12
In general, the configuration of payoffs in (31) implies that coexisting
generations never cooperate. To see this, consider a qualified-majority rule –
that is, if both cohorts vote for a given regime in t, this regime will be
established; otherwise, the previous regime is maintained (ηt = ηt−1).13 In
this case, any regime established at t = 0 becomes a self-sustained regime
irrespective of the population growth rate:
Lemma 5. Under qualified-majority voting, if (32) holds, then ηt = η0 in
each t > 0.
It follows from the above discussion that intergenerational compromise
is lacking as long as old agents have no incentives to cooperate with the
currently young. In this respect, cooperative voting may be induced by a
positive cost of regime-switching. More precisely, a transfer regime already
in place is sustained indefinitely with unanimous consensus, provided that
a regime switch involves relevant costs for all agents. The presence of
regime-switching costs can be interpreted in two ways: it may reflect an
exogenous (e.g. administrative) cost of reforms, or represent an ’over-rule
tax’. In either case, the analysis of payoffs is identical: denoting by t (ηt−1)
the welfare cost of a regime switch in period t, and by V¯t individual payoffs,
the following result holds:
Lemma 6. Suppose ηt−1 = 1 at t > 0. If
t(1) >  (40)
and
t+1(1) > log
(
1 + µz˜
µ + µz˜
)α
, (41)
agents born in t support transfers in both periods of life. If (40)–(41) hold
at all t ≥ 0, setting η0 = 1 implies unanimous support for transfers at all
future dates.
The reasoning behind Lemma 6 is that when the loss implied by a
regime switch is sufficiently high, permanent transfers become the first-
best individual payoff: in fact, satisfying condition (41 ) implies V¯t (1, 1) >
V¯t (1, 0), so that agents will vote for resource-saving transfers not only
(old) agents. Sincere voting implies that the political outcome ηt coincides with
the action of the young when n > 0. Hence, if n > 0 and condition (32) holds,
resource-saving transfers are voted into existence from t = 0 onward.
12 The reason for this result is that, in pension games, young agents – the majority
of citizens when n > 0 – do not finance current pensions in the absence of
commitment devices that bind the next generation (see Azariadis and Galasso,
2002: 260).
13 This voting mechanism is used in many countries, e.g. while voting to modify
constitutional norms, in order to guarantee that specific norms are also accepted
by at least a fraction of parties that usually oppose the ’standard majority’.
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when young (in t), but also when old (in t + 1). With respect to this
result, we can make three remarks. First, Lemma 6 does not assume that
the usual critical condition be satisfied, since condition (40) is sufficient
to have V¯t (1, 1) > V¯t (0, 0) and is less restrictive than (32).14 Second, the
cost of regime-switching is assumed to be time-varying and regime-
contingent for the sake of generality: if it is interpreted as an exogenous
administrative cost, further assumptions yield symmetry in states (i.e. going
from laissez-faire to transfers is as costly as doing the opposite reform) and
stationary costs, in which case conditions (40)–(41) can be expressed in
terms of exogenous parameters. Third, the cost of regime-switching can be
alternatively interpreted as an over-rule tax, which essentially constitutes a
commitment technology for young generations.
More generally, in the vast majority of sequential games, a paternalistic
action at t = 0 is required to induce permanent resource-saving transfers.
It should be stressed, however, that this variant of the ’first-father problem’
does not originate in the distortionary character of transfers: recalling the
results of section 3.2, the amount of resources subtracted from the initial
old is even higher under a first-best policy. If the first father faced an
exclusive choice between first- and second-best policies, he would vote
for distortionary transfers in order to avoid expropriation.
4. Capital, monopoly rents and R&D activity
The basic model is now extended to include other assets, in addition
to natural capital, which represent individual wealth. In this section,
we present critical conditions that are conceptually analogous to (32), in
the presence of man-made capital, monopolistic sectors, and R&D firms
developing innovations. For simplicity, we rule out population growth
(n = 0) and normalize total labor supply to unity (Nt = 1). Exogenous
progress is also ruled out (δ = 0), since we will reintroduce endogenous
technical change under a slightly different production function (section 4.3).
Mathematical derivations and details about the models considered in this
section can be found in Valente (2006).
4.1. Man-made capital
With δ = 0, the model with man-made capital is essentially that in
Mourmouras (1993: section 6), with the addition of distortionary transfers.
Aggregate output is now given by Y = Xα1 Nα2 K α3 with constant returns to
scale (α1 + α2 + α3 = 1), implying
yt = xα1t kα3t , (42)
where k ≡ K/N is individual capital. Agents may allocate savings in assets
representing either natural or man-made capital. Tax-subsidy rates (d , τ ) are
constant and set compatibly with a balanced budget in each period, and the
aggregate constraint of the economy is kt+1 = yt − ct − et . The equilibrium
14 In fact, the critical condition (32) implies  < 0, but ( 40) can be satisfied even if
 > 0.
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is characterized by
ct = (1 + β)−1wt , (43)
i kt+1 =
qt+1
qt
(
1 + ε
1 − d
)
= et+1
βct
, (44)
where i kt+1 is the interest factor, equal to the gross marginal rent from man-
made capital. The central term in (44) is due to the Hotelling rule – the
net rate of growth in resource prices must equal the interest rate – whereas
the last term derives from the standard Euler condition for consumption
allocation. The equilibrium propensity to invest is now affected by the
capital share α3, which in turn modifies the depletion index zt = xt/at . With
constant tax-subsidy rates, zt is constant and given by
α3
(
1 − d
1 + z
)
+ α1
z
(1 − d)(1 − τ ) − α2β
1 + β = 0. (45)
Expression (45) reduces to a quadratic equation in z with only one
admissible (positive) root. With d = τ = 0, the same procedure gives the
laissez-faire value z˜. Equilibrium dynamics thus feature a constant rate
of depletion of the resource stock, θ x = (1 + ε)(1 + z)−1, whereas output
and man-made capital display transitional dynamics. However, man-made
capital and output converge to the same (constant) growth rate in the long
run, which equals15
lim
t→∞ θ
y
t = [(1 + ε)/(1 + z)]
α1
1−α3 . (46)
Expression (46) shows that a reduction in z increases the long-term growth
rate more intensively the higher the capital share α3. This suggests that the
presence of capital improves the effectiveness of resource-saving policies
in sustaining welfare over time. To address this point, consider a policy
target µ = z′/z˜ < 1. As shown in Valente (2006), the critical condition for
obtaining  < 0 is independent of the presence of transitional dynamics,16
and reads (
1 + µz˜
µ + µz˜
)α1+α1β(1+α3) (1 + µz˜
1 + z˜
)α1β
< 1 (47)
in each period. With respect to the basic model of section 3.1, a slight
complication is that z˜ is not linear in α1, and the critical condition for the
resource share must be obtained numerically. Results differ substantially
from the predictions of the basic model: in the model of section 3.1,
15 Since limt→∞ θ
y
t = limt→∞ θ kt , technology (42) implies θ yt = (θ xt )α1 (θ yt )α3 as t → ∞.
Substituting θ xt = (1 + ε)(1 + z)−1 in this expression we obtain (46).
16 Condition (47) is obtained by direct substitution of equilibrium relations in the
utility function, without assuming steady-state growth rates in man-made capital
and output (see Valente, 2006). Since the critical condition depends on the natural
capital–resource asset ratio, having a constant z in any policy regime implies a
time-invariant inequality, which determines the sign of the welfare gap  in any
period.
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condition (32) is usually met for values of the resource share exceeding
0.5 – a rather high value, from an empirical perspective. In the present
model, instead, capital productivity affects condition (47) through α3, and
the critical threshold is far below 0.5 under reasonable parameters. In
the example reported in table 1, we fix α2 = 0.4 and let α1 and α3 vary,
assuming β = 0.625. The critical resource share is α∗1  0.17 with ‘light
policies’ (µ = 0.9), and increases with heavier tax-subsidy rates (α∗1  0.32
with µ = 0.7). The interpretation of this result is that the presence of capital
enhances the mechanism via which first-period subsidies may compensate,
in terms of utility, the negative effects of second-period taxation: the
reduction in resource depletion in t increases output levels in t + 1, with
a positive level effect on private returns from natural and man-made
capital. The next section shows that this conclusion is robust to alternative
assumptions regarding the nature of financial assets held by private agents.
4.2. Monopoly rents
In this section we substitute man-made capital with assets representing
claims over future monopoly rents. This framework will be extended in
section 4.3 to include endogenous technical change generated by R&D
activity. The supply side of the economy now consists of producers of final
output (Y) and firms producing intermediate products (B). Final output
is obtained by means of natural capital, labor, and a number g (assumed
exogenous, for the moment) of intermediate goods’ varieties. Denoting by
B( j) the quantity of the j th intermediate output equals
Yt = Xν1t Nν2
g∑
j=1
Bν3( j),t , (48)
where ν1 + ν2 + ν3 = 1. Each variety is produced by a monopolist with
unit production cost. Denoting by pb( j) the price of intermediates, each
monopolist maximizes profits π¯( j) = B( j) pb( j) − B( j) taking the demand
schedule of final producers as given. First-order conditions imply pb( j) = ν−13
in each period, so that prices and quantities of intermediates are invariant
across varieties
Bt = B( j),t = (ν23 Xν1t Nν2 )
1
1−ν3 . (49)
Monopolistic firms are owned by the currently old generation. Old agents
in period t thus receive the per capita profit rate
gπt = (g/ν3)(1 − ν3)bt , (50)
where πt = π¯t/N and bt ≡ Bt/N. Note that (49) and (50) imply that output
grows at the same rate as intermediate quantities and monopoly profits
yt = ν−23 gbt , θ yt = θ bt = θπt . (51)
Each firm producing a variety holds the relevant patent, and old agents
control the exclusive right to produce existing intermediate goods. Since
individuals die after the second period, young agents buy patents in
period t in order to run monopolistic firms in t + 1. This is equivalent
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to assuming that the young invest in single-period obligations of a
consolidated intermediate sector, representing claims over future monopoly
rents. Denote by v( j),t the forward patent value, i.e. the value in period t of a
patent exploitable to produce the j th variety in period t + 1. Since profits
are invariant across varieties, v( j),t = vt for any j ∈ [1, g]. The total value
of patents in the intermediate sector is Ft ≡ gvt , and individual budget
constraints read
ct = wt − qtat(1 − d) − ft , (52)
et+1 = pt+1xt+1(1 − τ ) + qt+1at+1 + gπt+1 + ft+1, (53)
where f ≡ F/N. The implicit interest factor is now defined as the gross
return on assets
i ft+1 = (πt+1 + ft+1)/ ft , (54)
and the aggregate constraint of the economy is
yt = ct + et + gbt. (55)
Optimality conditions for consumers are the same as in the model with
capital – i.e. (43) and (44), with i ft+1 replacing i
k
t+1 in (44). The natural
capital-resource asset ratio is constant in equilibrium, and equals
z = (1 − d)[(1 − ν23 )(1 + β) − ν2](ν2β)−1 − 1. (56)
A constant propensity to invest in resources implies constant rates of
resource use and output growth. In particular, since θ yt = θ bt , we have
θ
y
t = (θ xt )ν1 (θ bt )ν3 = (θ xt )
ν1
1−ν3 = [(1 + ε)/(1 + z)]
ν1
1−ν3 . (57)
Hence, similarly to the model with man-made capital, the presence of
intermediates amplifies the growth effects induced by resource-saving
policies: transfers increase θ y by reducing z, and the exponent in (57) is
increasing in the intermediates share ν3. The dynamic interaction between
resource use and investment in intermediate firms is as follows. The rate
of depletion θ x determines output growth θ y, which is in turn the rate
at which monopoly rents develop over time – see (51). Hence, reducing
the rate of resource use sustains not only output, but also the profitability
of monopolistic firms that represent investment opportunities for young
agents. We thus expect a positive influence of ν3 on the critical condition for
 < 0. The welfare gap V(0, 0) − V(1, 1) now reads
 = log
⎧⎨
⎩
(
1
µ
) ν1(1+β)
1−ν3
(
1 + µz˜
1 + z˜
) ν1(1+2β)
1−ν3
⎫⎬
⎭ , (58)
where z˜ is given by setting d = 0 in (56). Looking at table 1, numerical
substitutions suggest that monopoly rents imply  < 0 for a wide range of
parameters: considering different policy targets (µ) and comparable values
of input shares, the critical threshold with monopoly rents equals ν∗1  0.17
with µ = 0.9, and falls short of that obtained with man-made capital under
stricter policy targets (ν∗1  0.27 with µ = 0.7).
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4.3. R&D activity
The previous model is now extended to include a third sector which
develops innovations: R&D firms invent new varieties of intermediates,
thereby increasing the number of monopolistic firms operating in the
economy. We thus obtain a variant of the expanding-varieties model (see
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004), which includes overlapping generations and
resource extraction. Aggregate output equals
Yt = Xν1t Nν2
gt∑
j=1
Bν3( j),t , (59)
where the number of intermediate varieties, gt , is now endogenous and
generally time-varying. The behavior of monopolistic firms is as before,
with profit-maximizing conditions implying pbt = 1/ν3 and Bt = B( j),t given
by (49). From (59) and (49), equilibrium output per capita is
yt = gtxν1t bν3t = ν−23 gtbt , (60)
and equilibrium dynamics imply
θ
y
t+1 = θ gt+1θ bt+1, θ bt+1 = (θ xt+1)
ν1
1−ν3 . (61)
R&D firms operating in period t invent new varieties that monopolistic
firms will exploit at t + 1. In order to develop (gt+1 − gt) new varieties, the
R&D sector consumes h¯t units of output, and the innovation technology is
gt+1 − gt = ξt h¯t , (62)
where ξt , the marginal productivity of R&D expenditure, is affected by
aggregate spillovers generating endogenous growth. In the R&D literature,
spillovers are typically formalized as knowledge-stock externalities,
implying that current R&D activity is more productive the better the state-
of-the-art at the aggregate level. In the present model, a convenient index
for the state of technology is given by the ratio between the number of
existing varieties and current output levels. Assuming a positive relation
between ξt and the state of technology, the aggregate productivity of the
R&D sector increases with the economy-wide rate of R&D investment:
ξt = ψ(gt/yt), θ gt+1 = 1 + ψhmt , (63)
where ψ > 0 is a proportionality factor, and hmt ≡ h¯t/yt is the rate of R&D
investment determining, by (62 ), the rate of expansion in intermediates’
varieties. Since profits are invariant across varieties, the value of each new
blueprint equals the forward value of a patent vt , and equilibrium in the
R&D sector requires17
vt = 1/ξt. (64)
17 Condition (64) maximizes profits vt(gt+1 − gt) − h¯t and implies zero extra profits
in the R&D sector. The same condition is equivalently obtained assuming free
entry in the R&D business for an indefinite number of firms, as in Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (2004: Chapter 6).
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From the households’ point of view, R&D firms represent an additional
asset: R&D investment in period t allows young agents to run (gt+1 − gt)
new monopolistic firms in the subsequent period, obtaining higher second-
period income through (i) additional monopoly profits from intermediates’
production, and (ii) additional patent sales to newborn generations in t + 1.
This mechanism is summarized by the individual constraints
ct = wt − qtat(1 − d) − ft − ht , (65)
et+1 = pt+1xt+1(1 − τ ) + qt+1at+1 + gt+1πt+1 + ft+1, (66)
where ft = gtvt as before, and ht is R&D investment per capita which equals
agents’ expenditure to obtain patents for new intermediates. From (64), in
aggregate we have
ht = h¯t = (1/ξt)(gt+1 − gt), (67)
the implicit interest factor is18
i ht+1 =
gt(πt+1 + vt+1)
ft
= (gt+1 − gt)(πt+1 + vt+1)
ht
, (68)
and the aggregate constraint now reads
yt = ct + et + gtbt + ht. (69)
Expression (69) shows that output can be allocated to consumption,
production of intermediates, or R&D investment in each period. Optimality
conditions for consumers are again represented by (43) and (44), with i ht+1
replacing the interest factor in (44). The equilibrium propensity to invest in
resources is constant, and the depletion index z is recursively determined
by the system
z = (1 − d)[1 + ψν3(1 − ν3)][1 + ψhm]−1 − 1, (70)
hm = ν2β(1 + β)−1 − ψ−1 − ν1(1 − d)(1 − τ )z−1, (71)
which can be solved as a quadratic equation in z with a unique positive
root. From (71), the marginal propensity to invest in R&D, hm, is constant
as well and the equilibrium features balanced growth: output per capita
grows at the constant rate19
θ y = θ g(θ x)
ν1
1−ν3 = (1 + ψhm)[(1 + ε)/(1 + z)]
ν1
1−ν3 . (72)
18 Non-resource income in (66) can be decomposed as the sum of (i) current profits
and patent sales of the gt firms that already existed in t, and (ii) the gross
return to R&D investment – i.e. profits plus patent sales generated by new
blueprints. Condition (68) states that the two returns must coincide in equilibrium:
indeed, substituting either (67) or ft = gtvt in (68) gives the standard no-arbitrage
condition vtit+1 = πt+1 + vt+1.
19 Rewriting the innovation frontier as θ gt+1 = 1 + ψhm and substituting in (61), we
obtain (72).
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Since consumption is proportional to output levels, the necessary and
sufficient condition for non-declining welfare is
(1 + ψhm)[(1 + ε)/(1 + z)]
ν1
1−ν3 ≥ 1, (73)
which confirms that prospects for sustainability are improved by
endogenous technical change – here represented by the rate of expansion
in intermediate varieties (1 + ψhm). The effect of intergenerational transfers
on the growth rate is twofold. On the one hand, positive tax-subsidy rates
reduce the depletion index z, implying the usual mechanism: from (72), a
reduction in z directly increases the output growth rate θ y, and this effect
is stronger the higher are the shares of resources (ν1) and intermediates
(ν3) in production. On the other hand, taxes and subsidies also affect the
marginal propensity to invest in R&D, and thereby the rate of expansion in
intermediate varieties (1 + ψhm). This second effect is generally ambiguous,
but rather unlikely to imply a reduction of output growth following a
decrease in the resource depletion rate.20
The critical condition for  < 0 is(
1
µ
)(
1 + µz˜
1 + z˜
) 1+2β
1+β
> 1, (74)
with numerical results reported in table 1. For the different policy targets
considered, the critical levels of the resource share in the R&D model
occupy intermediate positions if compared with previous models: with
R&D activity, the critical threshold ν∗1 is slightly higher than that obtained
with monopoly rents, but may be lower than that obtained in the model with
man-made capital with strict policy targets (cf. table 1 with µ = 0.7). Notice,
however, that a sustainability–targeted policy is more politically feasible
withR&D activity: the reason is that sustainability conditions differ between
the present model and that with monopoly rents – see (57) and (72) –
and the growth rate in the economy with R&D is generally higher. Hence,
achieving sustainability in the R&D economy involves a smaller deviation
from laissez-faire (that is, a higher µ) with respect to the economy with
monopoly rents, which grows less and must fill a bigger sustainability gap
(that is, requires a lower µ). As a consequence, the critical threshold becomes
less restrictive for the economy with R&D firms.21
20 The effect of a variation in tax-subsidy rates on hm is generally ambiguous since
a variation in d and τ modifies both the numerator and denominator in the last
term in (71). However, an interior equilibrium with positive R&D activity requires
ψ > 1 (see Valente, 2006) and this implies that possible reductions in hm would not
reduce the rate of expansion 1 + ψhm substantially. The net effect of a reduction
in z on output growth thus remains largely determined by the usual mechanism
induced by resource preservation.
21 For example, set ν1 = 0.25, ν3 = 0.35, and suppose that the R&D economy requires
a reduction of the depletion index corresponding to µ = 0.9. Recalling (57) and
(72), the R&D economy can be safely assumed to be growing faster than a no-R&D
economy with monopoly rents. The latter economy thus requires higher levels of
tax-subsidy rates to achieve sustainability, corresponding to (e.g.) µ = 0.7. Under
these parameters (ν1 = 0.25, ν3 = 0.35), table 1 shows that the sustainability policy
would be politically supported in the R&D economy (R =−0.0012 with µ = 0.9),
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Table 1. The welfare gap  under different policy targets in the three variants of the model, with β = 0.625: monopoly rents (M), R&D firms
(R), and man-made capital (K : in this case, input shares read α1, α2, α3). The welfare gap becomes negative when the resource share (first
column) reaches a critical threshold
Input shares µ = 0.9 µ = 0.8 µ = 0.7
ν1 ν2 ν3 
M R K M R K M R K
0.15 0.40 0.45 0.0007 0.0066 0.0001 0.0033 0.0180 0.0010 0.0085 0.0363 0.0034
0.20 0.40 0.40 −0.0007 0.0021 −0.0004 0.0006 0.008. 0.0004 0.0046 0.0204 0.0030
0.25 0.40 0.35 −0.0022 −0.0012 −0.0010 −0.0025 0.0011 −0.0006 0.0002 0.0087 0.0019
0.30 0.40 0.30 −0.0037 −0.0037 −0.0018 −0.0055 −0.0043 −0.0020 −0.0042 −0.0003 0.0017
0.35 0.40 0.25 −0.0051 −0.0056 −0.0027 −0.0082 −0.0086 −0.0037 −0.0084 −0.0073 −0.0021
0.40 0.40 0.20 −0.0063 −0.0072 −0.0037 −0.0107 −0.1190 −0.0057 −0.0121 −0.0127 −0.0049
0.45 0.40 0.15 −0.0073 −0.0083 −0.0049 −0.0128 −0.0144 −0.0080 −0.0152 −0.0170 −0.0081
0.50 0.40 0.10 −0.0081 −0.0092 −0.0062 −0.0145 −0.0164 −0.0106 −0.0177 −0.0202 −0.0118
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5. Remarks
The connections between the present analysis and related literature can
be summarized as follows. Mourmouras (1993) uses the basic model
of section 2 (with δ = 0) to show that competition may lead to over-
exploitation of privately–owned renewable resources, and describes a set
of conservationist policies implementing the Rawlsian optimum. A first
difference is the aim of the present analysis: our focus is the existence of
situations where agents prefer transfers to laissez-faire for purely selfish
reasons, without assuming a predetermined social objective. Second, we
have studied individual payoffs in a regime-contingent formulation in order
to investigate under what technological and institutional circumstances
agents would agree on a higher rate of natural preservation. Third, we
have extended the model to include technical progress, monopoly rents,
and R&D activity, obtaining new insights about the intensity of the welfare
effects induced by a higher degree of resource preservation.22
In the literature on resource economics, intergenerational transfers are
also considered by Howarth (1991) and Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001, 2003).
In Howarth (1991), uncertainty about states of nature implies that
the competitive equilibrium may be inefficient: considering a max–min
welfare criterion, Howarth (1991) shows that an optimal scheme of
intergenerational transfers allows the economy to obtain intergenerational
fairness while restoring efficiency. Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001) consider
a production economy where the resource stock has a positive amenity
value, and show that a ’trust fund’ policy, where future generations receive
claims for the natural resource, ensures efficiency and protects the welfare
of all generations. In a similar model, Gerlagh and Keyzer (2003) show that
conservationist measures may implement optimal allocations that would
not be achieved through competitive markets. The common merit of these
contributions is to show that fairness may be achieved through policies that
also preserve efficiency, in line with the view that intergenerational equity
and intertemporal efficiency are distinct, and not necessarily conflicting,
objectives (Howarth and Norgaard, 1990).23 As noted in the Introduction,
this view is not challenged by the present analysis, which – apart from
substantial differences in the underlying models 24 – focuses on the different
while it would not be in the economy with monopoly rents (M = 0.0002 with
µ = 0.7).
22 All the above differences also apply with respect to Krautkraemer and Batina
(1999), where the basic model is extended to include a stock-dependent rate of
resource regeneration.
23 Related approaches to fiscal policy with overlapping generations are also present
in the literature on environmental degradation. Marini and Scaramozzino (1995)
consider pollution externalities and derive the optimal abatement program under
the Calvo–Obstfeld criterion for intergenerational equity. In a similar model,
Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998) show that public debt policy can be used to
redistribute in a ’fair’ manner across generations the burden of taxation implied
by efficient public abatement.
24 With respect to the present analysis, important differences are represented by
uncertainty (which plays a crucial role in Howarth, 1991) and non-essentiality of
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issue of individual motives for supporting resource-saving policies. The
fact that, in the present model, a first-best policy features an implicit
redistribution of property rights across generations is in line with the main
findings of Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001, 2003).
Emphasizing the role of selfish behavior, our analysis is close to the view
that intergenerational exchange need not be linked to parental altruism,
as recently argued by Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) and Rangel (2003).
The general question asked by these authors is: why should present
generations invest in assets that are valuable only to future ones? Boldrin
and Rustichini (2000) and Rangel (2003) use game-theoretical arguments to
show that intergenerational transfers may arise as voting equilibria when
dynastic altruism is absent.25 In particular, Boldrin and Rustichini (2000)
show that pay-as-you-go social security can be voted into existence by
the majority, because the reduction in current saving implied by taxation
raises future returns on capital, thus compensating for the negative effect
of pension financing. Recalling Proposition 3, our main result hinges on
a different mechanism: the reduction in the rate of extraction implied by
resource-saving transfers improves production possibilities in the future,
and the positive effect on second-period income more than compensates
for the negative effect of taxation (provided that resource productivity is
sufficiently high).
With respect to models of social security, the opposite direction
of transfers in the present analysis (old-to-young) implies substantial
differences also from a policymaking perspective, since commitment
technologies change. A social security system is supported only
if young generations believe that they will receive second-period
transfers (Browning, 1975), and this generally requires an intergenerational
commitment device – i.e. an institutional arrangement that binds genera-
tions yet to be born; in the literature on social security, this device takes
various forms, such as social contracts (Hammond, 1975; Sjoblom, 1985),
reputational mechanisms (Kotlikoff et al., 1988; Cooley and Soares, 1998),
or constitutional norms (Azariadis and Galasso, 2002). Resource-saving
policies, instead, are supported when young individuals who receive
subsidies accept to pay second-period taxes: this requires an intertemporal
commitment device that binds a given generation in the subsequent period,
such as lifetime contracts (section 3.3). Further differences with respect to
the social security literature arise, as shown in section 3.4, in the context of
sequential voting games due to the particular configuration of payoffs in
our model.
the resource for producing output – which allows Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001) to
consider zero-extraction paths with positive output, a possibility that is ruled out
in our model.
25 Rangel (2003) shows that positive expenditures in goods that only benefit the
elderly (such as social security) are necessary to achieve an equilibrium with
efficient investment in goods that benefit future generations (such as clean
environment and education).
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6. Conclusions
This paper analyzed the welfare properties of distortionary transfers in a
growth model with overlapping generations and privately owned natural
capital. In this framework, unsustainability and resource depletion are a
likely outcome of excessive competition, and implementing father-to-son
transfers generates a higher degree of resource preservation. The main result
is that all newborn agents prefer distortionary intergenerational transfers
in both periods of life to persistent laissez-faire conditions, provided that
the resource share exceeds a critical threshold level. The reason is that the
reduction in the rate of depletion implied by transfers improves production
possibilities in the future: if resource productivity is relatively high, the
positive effect on second-period output more than compensates (in welfare
terms) for the negative effect of taxation. This mechanism is enhanced by the
presence of other assets in addition to natural capital. Extending the model
to include man-made capital, monopoly rents and R&D sectors, it is shown
that the critical condition becomes less restrictive because the returns from
these assets also benefit from the positive growth effect induced by a higher
degree of preservation.
The welfare time-path implied by resource-saving policies is not Pareto
comparable with that obtained under laissez-faire, because resource owners
at time zero suffer a welfare loss due to taxation of the initial stock. The
private desire for resource-saving policies unfolds only if agents are either
subject to credible pre-commitment, or induced to cooperate with adjacent
generations. In the first regard, a succession of lifetime contracts would
allow a central authority to implement resource-saving policies in the
indefinite future: if young agents are asked to choose between permanent
transfers and permanent laissez-faire, the former option is strictly preferred.
In a sequential-choice context, the lack of intergenerational cooperation
implies that alternative commitment devices must be set, e.g. in the form of
positive costs of regime-switching. In both cases, agents support resource-
saving policies for purely selfish reasons, and a paternalistic action is
required at time zero. These two features recall the logic of intergenerational
transfers a` la Gale (1973): if the first resource owner partially renounces his
claim over initial endowments, the transmission of this credit forward in
time yields welfare gains for all successive generations.
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